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Ownership concentration, contestability, family firms, and capital structure

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dc.contributor.authorSantos, M. S.
dc.contributor.authorMoreira, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorVieira, E.S.
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-29T18:58:43Z
dc.date.available2026-01-29T18:58:43Z
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.date.updated2026-01-27T11:17:47Z
dc.description.abstractThis study analyses the distribution of power among the several blockholders of a firm and the identity of those blockholders as a determinant of firm leverage. Using a sample of 694 firms from 12 Western European countries, our results support a negative relationship between ownership concentration in the hands of the main blockholder and firm leverage. Moreover, we detect that the presence of a second and third large shareholder (beyond the first blockholder) has a significant positive effect on the leverage ratio. In addition, the results show that contestability in family firms plays a more relevant role. Finally, we show that family firms do have significant impact on firm leverage level, and this impact varies depending on the legal framework and institutional environment. In our main sample the results show family firms negatively affect market leverage, supporting the theory that family firms are more averse to an increase in the debt level due to the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress as a result of having an under-diversified portfolio. In contrast, the opposite effect is found in the sample that excludes the United Kingdom. This last result cannot be explained by agency theory, given that family businesses are those that suffer less from Type I agency problems. This result suggests either some difficulty in financing their investments by issuing new equity or the need to use debt as a signal of the quality of its investments. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests.eng
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10997-013-9272-7en_US
dc.identifier.eid2-s2.0-84918813725en_US
dc.identifier.slugcv-prod-367349
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.2/21090
dc.language.isoeng
dc.peerreviewedyes
dc.rights.uriN/A
dc.subjectOwnership concentration
dc.subjectAgency costs
dc.subjectLeverage
dc.subjectFamily
dc.subjectContestability
dc.titleOwnership concentration, contestability, family firms, and capital structureeng
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.endPage1107
oaire.citation.issue4en_US
oaire.citation.startPage1063
oaire.citation.titleJournal of Management and Governanceen_US
oaire.citation.volume18en_US
oaire.versionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
person.familyNameMoreira
person.givenNameAntonio
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-6613-8796
rcaap.cv.cienciaid541F-5442-5666 | António Carrizo Moreira
rcaap.rightsrestrictedAccessen_US
relation.isAuthorOfPublication51ad303d-335c-4e2f-bae3-fffffef2e2f5
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery51ad303d-335c-4e2f-bae3-fffffef2e2f5

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